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AbstractIn Portugal, increases in investment expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favouring highly
visible items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking re-election. The political
payoff to opportunistic spending increased after democracy became well-established in the country.
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1. Introduction
The objective of this article is to determine whether opportunistic mayors can increase their chances of re-
election1 by generating political budgetary cycles around elections. We test the hypothesis that pre-electoral
increases in municipal expenditures and changes in their composition, favouring items most visible to or
preferred by the electorate, are associated with higher vote percentages for the incumbent mayor. Research is
conducted over a dataset comprising all Portuguese mainland municipalities, from 1979 to 2001.
In previouswork, Veiga andVeiga (2007) found strong evidence of political budgetary cycles in Portuguese
municipalities. They also showed that electoral cycles were stronger for investment items highly visible to the
electorate, for example, construction spending on public infrastructure. Given these results, it would also be
⁎ Corresponding author. Escola de Economia e Gestão, Universidade do Minho, 4710057 Braga, Portugal. Tel.: +351
253604564; fax: +351 253676375.
E-mail address: linda@eeg.uminho.pt (L.G. Veiga).
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interesting to know if voters reward (or punish) politicians' opportunistic spending policies. Additionally,
because democracy was reestablished in Portugal in 1974, during our sample period the country has evolved
from a “new” to an “established” democracy. Thismakes Portugal an appropriate laboratory for analyzing if the
determinants of electoral results change as a democracy matures.
There are several other reasons that make Portugal an interesting case for study. First, we have very
detailed data on local governments' financial accounts. Second, the mayor is a principal decision-maker in
178 L.G. Veiga, F.J. Veiga / Economics Letters 96 (2007) 177–182the allocation of resources and the distribution of investment in the municipality. Third, the institutional
structure of local governments and the policy instruments available are the same for all Portuguese
localities. Finally, election dates are fixed and defined exogenously from the perspective of the local
authorities, and all municipalities have elections on the same day.2
2. Data, model specification and results
The dataset is composed of data on a set of political, financial and economic variables for 275
Portuguese mainland municipalities, for years from 1979 to 2001.3 Since this article tries to determine
whether or not political opportunism bymayors pays off, only the cases in which they run for re-election are
considered.
The two models used in the empirical work are specified as follows:
Votesit ¼ aVotesi;prev:el: þ /YMit þ cGPit þ b1IEit þ b2IEi;t−1 þ b3IEi;t−2 þ mi þ eit ð1Þ
Votesit ¼ aVotesi;prev:el: þ /YMit þ cGPit þ b1IEtmit þ b2IEdevit þ m1 þ eit ð2Þ
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exclude Votesit is the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent's party in the municipality i, in
on of year t, Votesi,prev.el. is the percentage of votes obtained in the previous election, YMit stands
ears Mayor (the number of years the mayor of municipality i has been in office), GPit is a measure
4overnment Performance/Popularity, IE are levels of real per capita Investment Expenditures (in
lection year, t; the year before elections, t−1; and 2 years before elections, t−2),5 IEtm is its term2 During the sample period, there were local elections in 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001, always in December.
3 Election dates and municipal electoral results were obtained from STAPE, Portugal. The government popularity index is
based on monthly surveys published in the newspaper Expresso, from 1986 to 2001. Data on municipal accounts and
population, from 1979 to 2001, were obtained from DGAL, Portugal. Data on the total number of employees in firms within
each municipality and on their average wages, since 1985, were obtained from the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Socialrity. Finally, the consumer price index was obtained from the OECD's Main Economic Indicators.
vernment Performance is accounted for by the following two interaction variables: Government's Party⁎Inflation Rate;
overnment's Party⁎Government Popularity. The dummy variable Government's Party takes the value of one when the
's party is the same as that of the Prime Minister, and equals zero otherwise. By interacting this variable with the Inflation
r Government Popularity, we account for the possibility that the votes for an incumbent mayor whose political party is in
of the national government are affected by the performance/popularity of the latter.
ce the first terms were only 3-years long, when working with the full sample it is not possible to include the level of
ditures 3 years before elections. In the estimations, lags that turned out as not statistically significant were sequentially
ed.
Table 1
Investment expenditures
Votes 1979–2001 1979–1989 1990–2001 1986–2001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Votes (previous election) 0.447
(10.9)⁎⁎⁎
0.459
(11.2)⁎⁎⁎
0.445
(6.71)⁎⁎⁎
0.486
(5.27)⁎⁎⁎
0.233
(3.41)⁎⁎⁎
0.220
(3.18)⁎⁎⁎
0.149
(2.69)⁎⁎⁎
Years Mayor −0.836
(−10.7)⁎⁎⁎
−0.850
(−10.9)⁎⁎⁎
−1.664
(−9.22)⁎⁎⁎
−1.672
(−6.54)⁎⁎⁎
−0.772
(−6.77)⁎⁎⁎
−0.782
(−6.85)⁎⁎⁎
−0.837
(−8.80)⁎⁎⁎
Government's Party*
Inflation Rate
−0.172
(−3.75)⁎⁎⁎
−0.173
(−3.81)⁎⁎⁎
−0.279
(−5.23)⁎⁎⁎
−0.206
(−2.70)⁎⁎⁎
Government's
Party*Government Popularity
0.068
(3.31)⁎⁎⁎
0.070
(3.37)⁎⁎⁎
0.034
(1.95)⁎
Investment expenditures
Election year 0.008
(2.01)⁎⁎
0.014
(1.73)⁎
0.013
(3.21)⁎⁎⁎
0.012
(3.27)⁎⁎⁎
Term mean 0.017
(3.88)⁎⁎⁎
0.005
(.34)
0.020
(3.21)⁎⁎⁎
%Deviation of election year
from the term mean
018
(1.71)⁎
0.017
(.63)
0.0029
(2.12)⁎⁎
Employment 0.0124
(1.12)
Real wages 0.0026
(3.29)⁎⁎⁎⁎
# Observations 1128 1136 597 486 650 650 839
# Municipalities 275 275 261 259 274 274 275
# Elections 6 6 4 3 3 3 4
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.040 0.041 0.036
Notes: Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects. Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as
the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent. Models estimated with a constant. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic
consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ⁎⁎⁎, 1%; ⁎⁎, 5%, and ⁎, 10%
6 Levels for Investment Expenditures in previous years are not statistically significant when included.
7 In the longer working paper version of this article (Veiga and Veiga, 2006), we also report estimation results for models
including budget balances, taxes, total expenditures, and current and capital expenditures. Evidence that opportunism pays off
was found for total and for capital expenditures. Since it was for investment expenditures that Veiga and Veiga (2007) found
greater evidence of political business cycles, only the results obtained for those are reported in the present paper.
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effect of municipality i, εit is the error term, and, α, ϕ, γ, β1, β2 and β3 are parameters to be estimated.
The estimation results of the panel data models described above, controlling for municipality fixed
effects, are shown in Table 1. Results for the full sample are consistent with the hypothesis that pre-
electoral manipulation of investment expenditures leads to a higher percentage of votes cast for the
incumbent mayor. Expenditures in the election year are statistically significant, with a positive sign
(column 1),6 and the same applies to the term mean and to the percentage deviation of the level of the
election year relative to the term mean (column 2).7 There is also evidence of systematic popularity
erosion over time (sometimes referred to as a “cost of ruling”), and support for the hypothesis that mayors
belonging to the prime minister's party lose votes when inflation is high.
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affects the size of the opportunistic cycle: when certain of winning by a large margin, she does not need to
engage in the manipulation of expenditures;8 but, when confronted with a close race, she has the greatest
incentive to behave opportunistically. However, even when a mayor does not expect a close race, she may
still want to increase expenditures shortly before elections, in order to elect as many deputies as possible
in the Town Hall and in the Municipal Assembly. Thus, the endogeneity bias may be small.9
In order to determine if expenditure manipulation affected votes in the same manner throughout time,
we split the sample into two parts. Results shown in columns 3 and 4 imply that opportunistic spending
was not highly vote-productive in the period 1979–1989, as investment expenditures are only marginally
statistically significant in column 3 and no effects of opportunism on votes are found in column 4. But,
results for the period 1990–2001 are stronger than for the full sample. Thus, electoral manipulation of the
timing of spending had higher pay off as the Portuguese democracy became more established after its
restoration in 1974. In these estimations, there is also evidence that government's popularity ratings affect
the votes obtained by mayors of the government party.10
The increasing importance of fiscal performance on voters' decisions over time is in line with
Brender's (2003) findings for Israel. It may result from a shift in voters' concerns away from ideological
issues to economic ones, as democracy matured, leading to a greater sensitivity of voters to the budget
cycle. But, contrary to Brender, who found evidence that the Israeli electorate started penalizing
incumbents for loose fiscal policy as democracy matured, our results suggest that the political pay off to
opportunistic spending increased after democracy became well-established in Portugal. A possible
explanation for this result is that, as the Portuguese democracy matured, politicians learned how to take
advantage of electoral institutions and, unlike in Israel, no significant measures were implemented to
increase the transparency of local governments' accounts. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that Alt
and Lassen (2006), working on a sample of advanced industrialized economies, identified a persistent
pattern of electoral cycles on low(er) transparency countries, while no such pattern could be observed in
high(er) transparency countries.
The next step of the empirical analysis was to include variables accounting for the economic
performance of municipalities. In column 7, municipal Employment and average real Wages were
included along with Investment Expenditures. Results for the latter are very similar to those of column 5.
While Employment does not seem to affect votes, higher Wages in the election year lead to greater
percentages of votes for the incumbent.11
In the estimations of Table 2, investment expenditures are broken up into their seven components. In
column 1, only Other Buildings and Miscellaneous Constructions are statistically significant. These
results were expected, as these are the most important and most visible components of Investment8 Although the incentive for opportunistic behavior may also be small for those who are certain of losing, they generally
decide not to run for re-election and, consequently, most of them are not included in our sample.
9 Since only the mayors who run for re-election are considered, most of the cases in our sample in which there is not a close
race correspond to situations in which the mayor is sure of winning. Consequently, our estimates are likely to underestimate the
causal relationship between opportunistic cycles and popularity.
10 The variable (Government's Party⁎Government Popularity) was not included in the previous estimations because
popularity data are only available after 1986.
11 Since data for unemployment and wages are only available after 1985 and that for government popularity after 1986, only
the elections that occurred between 1986 and 2001 are covered in this estimation.
Table 2
Components of investment expenditures
Votes 1 2
Votes (previous election) 0.0335 (6.42)⁎⁎⁎ 0.0298 (5.67)⁎⁎⁎
Years Mayor −0.0887 (−9.72)⁎⁎⁎ −0.0889 (−9.71)⁎⁎⁎
Government's Party*Inflation Rate −0.0146 (−2.05)⁎⁎ −0.0185 (−2.64)⁎⁎⁎
Main components
Acquisition of land: election year 0.0025 (0.074)
Housing: election year 0.0017 (1.07)
Other buildings: year before election 0.0039 (2.95)⁎⁎⁎⁎
Miscellaneous constructions: election year 0.0011 (2.46)⁎⁎
Transportation material: election year 0.0098 (1.39)
Machinery and equipment: election year 0.0036 (.75)
Other investments: election year 0.0021 (0.053)
Components of other buildings
Sports, recreational and schooling facilities: election year 0.0003 (0.22)
Social equipment: election year 0.0105 (1.97)⁎⁎
Other: year before election 0.0056 (3.12)⁎⁎⁎
Components of miscellaneous constructions
Overpasses, streets and complementary works: year before election 0.0030 (2.12)⁎⁎
Sewage: election year −0.0023 (−1.05)
Water treatment and distribution: election year −0.0030 (−1.84)⁎
Rural roads: election year 0.0019 (2.44)⁎⁎
Infrastructures for solid waste treatment: election year 0.0047 (1.11)
Other miscellaneous constructions: election year 0.0002 (0.33)
# Observations 934 930
# Municipalities 275 275
# Elections 5 5
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.033
Notes: Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects. Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as
the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent. Models estimated with a constant. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consisten
standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ⁎⁎⁎, 1%; ⁎⁎, 5%, and ⁎, 10%.
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Investment Expenditures even further, in order to analyze the three components of Other Buildings and
the 6 components of Miscellaneous Constructions. Results shown in column 2 indicate that votes can be
gained by increasing expenditures in the election year (or in the year before, in some cases) in Social
Equipment, Other, Overpasses, Streets and Complementary Works, and in Rural Roads.
3. Conclusions
Results indicate that higher investment expenditures in election years are associated with higher vote
percentages for incumbent mayors in Portuguese municipalities. This finding is in line with the evidence
presented by Akhmedov and Zhuravkaya (2004) for Russian regions. We also find that opportunistic
spending was more vote-productive after Portugal became an established democracy than it had been
when democracy was newly established. This may be a result of a lack of transparency regarding local
fiscal policies combined with the acquisition of knowledge by politicians, and with a greater sensitivity of
Portuguese voters to the budget cycle, as democracy matured.
182 L.G. Veiga, F.J. Veiga / Economics Letters 96 (2007) 177–182Electoral manipulation can also be accomplished by altering the composition of expenditures, as
suggested by Drazen and Eslava (2005). Our results show that opportunistic mayors should spend
relatively more on: Social Equipment; Other; Overpasses, Streets and Complementary works; and, Rural
roads. With the exception of Social Equipment, it was exactly for these components of investment
expenditures that Veiga and Veiga (2007) found greater evidence of political budgetary cycles.
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